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INTRODUCTION 
 Defendant and two friends tried to steal Victim’s car. For his 
participation in the attempted carjacking, Defendant was charged with 
aggravated robbery as an accomplice.  
 At trial, the jury was instructed on aggravated robbery and given three 
accomplice liability instructions: a statutory instruction, an elements 
instruction, and a definition instruction. 
  The jury also viewed Defendant’s videotaped police interview. In the 
video, Defendant told different stories of what happened but also appeared 
cooperative with the detective, remorseful, and consistently stated that he did 
not have a gun during the attempted robbery. The jury was allowed to take 
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the video to the jury room during its deliberations. Defense counsel did not 
object. After the jury had the video for about twenty minutes, defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial based on the jury having access to the video during 
deliberations. The trial court denied the motion, finding that no prejudice 
resulted because the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
guilty verdict. 
 On appeal, Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to one of the three accomplice liability instructions—the elements 
instruction—Instruction 40. To prevail, Defendant must prove both deficient 
performance and prejudice. Defendant’s ineffectiveness claim fails. 
Defendant cannot show his counsel performed deficiently because competent 
counsel could have reasonably concluded that Instruction 40 adequately 
conveyed the correct mental state alone or when read with the other 
instructions. For this same reason, Defendant cannot show prejudice. He also 
cannot show prejudice because ample evidence supported the jury’s verdict.  
 Defendant also argues that the video of his police interview should not 
have gone back to the jury room during deliberations. Defendant first argues 
his claim as though it had been preserved by a motion for mistrial made after 
the jury re-watched the video; alternatively, Defendant argues that his 
counsel was ineffective. But Defendant’s after-the-fact mistrial motion did 
-3- 
not suffice to preserve an objection to the jury re-watching the video during 
its deliberations. Accordingly, Defendant can prevail only if he proves that 
his counsel was ineffective. Because Defendant cannot prove either element, 
of his ineffectiveness claim, it necessarily fails. He cannot show prejudice 
because ample evidence supports that he intended to aid Rakes in the 
attempted carjacking and his arguments as to the impact of the video on the 
jury’s deliberations are purely speculative. Nor can Defendant show that no 
competent counsel would have allowed the jury to have access to the video 
during deliberations because the video was the only evidence of Defendant’s 
story.  
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 1. Has Defendant established that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
approving the accomplice liability elements instruction where competent 
counsel could have reasonably concluded that the instruction conveyed the 
correct mental state either by itself or when read with the other instructions? 
 2. Has Defendant established that his counsel was ineffective for 
allowing the jury to have access to Defendant’s police interview during their 
deliberations? 
-4- 
 Standard of Review. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal is a question of law. State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1,¶16, 247 
P.3d 344. 
 3. Did the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprive Defendant of 
a fair trial? 
 Standard of Review. This Court “will reverse only if the cumulative effect 
of the several errors undermines [its] confidence … that a fair trial was had.” 
State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶78, 387 P.3d 618 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993)) (omission in original).  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of relevant facts.1 
 Jesse Rakes, Michael Polk, and Defendant drove together to the Rio 
Grande area of Salt Lake City in Polk’s PT Cruiser and parked. R773. When 
Rakes saw Victim’s Dodge Challenger, he planned for the three men to steal 
it by pretending that the PT Cruiser needed a jump-start. Id.; State’s Exhibit 
(SE)11 (8:55-16:04). Defendant’s part in the robbery was perpetuating Rakes’s 
ruse by  pretending to look for jumper cables and threatening Victim with a 
gun. R845,848-51. 
                                              
1 The facts are recited “in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.’ 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,117 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted). 
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      ***** 
 Victim and Girlfriend were homeless and lived in Victim’s Dodge 
Challenger with their two dogs and all their possessions. R631. Early one the 
morning, Victim and Girlfriend drove to the Rio Grande area so Girlfriend 
could buy heroin. R551, 581. Before she could, Rakes approached their car 
and asked Victim to jump-start the PT Cruiser. R554. Victim agreed. R555.  
 Victim moved his Dodge Challenger, parked it “nose-to-nose” with the 
PT Cruiser, and popped the hood. R556. Rakes then popped the hood of the 
PT Cruiser. R636. As Defendant and Polk pretended to look for jumper cables, 
Victim stood on the passenger side of his car chatting with Rakes. R556-57, 
772. 
 Victim noticed that Defendant and Polk were taking a long time to find 
the cables and asked Rakes about it. R557. In response, Rakes pulled up his 
shirt, showed Victim his gun, and told Victim, “You know what this is. We 
are taking everything,.” R560, Tell your bitch to get out of the car or I’m going 
to pistol whip her.” R534,557-58. Defendant stood side-by-side with Rakes 
and showed his gun to Victim. R558.  
  Rakes pointed his gun at Victim and chased him around the Dodge 
Challenger. R562. In self-defense, Victim shot Rakes. R563. Rakes staggered 
to the middle of the street and fell over, unconscious. R564.  
-6- 
  Victim and Girlfriend tried to drive to safety. R563-64. But before 
Victim could shut the driver’s side door, Polk, driving the PT Cruiser, hit their 
car twice, causing the PT Cruiser to flip onto its roof. R563-65; SE 4, 5, 10. 
Victim and Girlfriend then drove their damaged car around the corner, 
tossed their gun and bullets, and waited for police. R566; SE 10.  
 After Rakes was shot, Defendant ran. R603, 714; SE 8, 9. An officer saw 
Defendant “walking at a quicker than normal pace” several blocks from the 
Rio Grande area. R712. The officer stopped Defendant because he matched a 
witness’s description. Id. When the officer asked Defendant if he had been 
near the Rio Grande area, Defendant denied it. R716. He told the officer that 
he “did not shoot anybody” and he did not “see anybody get shot.” R719.  
 Defendant was interviewed again at the police station and that 
interview was videotaped. SE 11. Defendant told the detective that he 
“[d]idn’t see nothing,” but “heard the sirens” and “heard a shot.” R752; SE 11 
(00:34-1:14).  
 After the detective told Defendant that Polk “put him in the car” and 
that Polk, Victim, and Girlfriend gave statements, Defendant gave a different 
story. R752, 756; SE 11 (1:14-1:60, 2:31, 5:46-7:39). Defendant told the detective 
that Victim asked for a jump-start and that Victim shot Rakes. R756; SE 11 
(2:31-3:23,5:46-7:39). Defendant said that he then ran from the scene. R756; SE 
-7- 
11 (2:31-3:23,5:46-7:39). Defendant admitted that he was at the trunk of the PT 
Cruiser looking for jumper cables and he approached the passenger side of 
the car, where Victim and Rakes were standing. SE 11 (2:31-3:20, 5:46-7:39). 
Defendant denied that either he or Rakes had a gun. SE 11 (7:28-7:30). 
Defendant said that was “all [he] knew.” SE 11 (3:18-3:22).  
 The detective then told Defendant that Rakes died. R763; SE 11 (7:42-
16:04). Defendant told a third story. R763; SE 11 (7:42-16:04). According to 
Defendant, it was Rakes’s idea to steal Victim’s car. R765-67, 775; SE 11 (8:55-
16:04). Defendant explained that Rakes “decided to [] pretend” the PT Cruiser 
needed a jump-start and asked Victim for one. SE 11 (9:37-9:50); R765-67. 
Defendant acknowledged that he knew Rakes’ jump-start story was a ruse 
but admitted that he went along with it by pretending to look for jumper 
cables. R765-66, 772; SE 11 (9:10-14:36). According to Defendant, Victim 
moved his car nose-to-nose with the PT Cruiser and stood on the passenger 
side of the Challenger with Rakes. SE 11 (11:20-15:18). Defendant walked up 
to Rakes and Victim, heard Rakes say “something” to Victim. R764, 773; SE 
11 (8:55-15:21). Defendant then saw Rakes chase Victim around Dodge 
Challenger and Victim shot Rakes. R764, 773; SE 11 (8:55-15:21). Defendant 
said that after he heard a gunshot, he walked away. R769, 773; SE 8, 9, 11 
(13:15-13:59).  
-8- 
 Although the video showed Defendant’s multiple versions of events 
and incriminating admissions, it also showed Defendant tell the detective 
that he did not have a gun, he tried to talk Rakes out of stealing the car, and 
there was not a plan to steal the car. R768; SE 11 (9:10-16:04).  
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court. 
 Defendant was charged as an accomplice to aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony. R66-68.  
 At trial, the parties agreed to give the jury three accomplice liability 
instructions: one quoting the language of the accomplice liability statute, 
Instruction 39, (R226); one setting forth the elements of accomplice liability, 
Instruction 40, (R227); and one defining the term accomplice, Instruction 41, 
(R228). R540. The trial court approved the instructions. Id. 
 The State supported its case with the testimony of Victim, (R547); 
Girlfriend, (630); the officer who saw Defendant walking quickly, (666); and 
the detective who interviewed Defendant, (R727); a surveillance video of the 
PT Cruiser repeatedly ramming Victim’s car, (SE10); photos taken from 
surveillance videos of Defendant leaving the scene, (SE8,9); and Defendant’s 
videotaped police interview, (SE11). The State argued that Defendant acted 
as an accomplice to aggravated robbery in two ways: when he pretended to 
-9- 
look for jumper cables and when he threatened Victim with a gun. R845, 848-
51. 
 During the State’s case-in-chief, the jury watched Defendant’s 
videotaped police interview and the video was entered into evidence. R751; 
SE 11. Defense counsel stipulated to both. R751, 799, 875; see also R248. 
  The video was approximately twenty-three-minutes long, but at trial, 
the State played only about the first seventeen minutes of it. R750-73; SE 11. 
The portion played showed the detective Mirandizing Defendant, 
questioning Defendant, and Defendant’s multiple stories. R750-73; SE 11 
(00:34-16:04). However, the State did not present the last seven minutes of the 
video that showed the detective telling Defendant that he was calling the 
district attorney, handcuffing Defendant, and photographing Defendant. 
R880; SE 6, 7, 11.  
 After closing argument, the trial court asked both parties to make sure 
that it had all the exhibits that needed to go to the jury room. R870-71. The 
court also asked the parties to provide a laptop for the jury to watch the video 
evidence. R870-71. Defense counsel did not object to the jury having access to 
any of the exhibits during its deliberations, including the video exhibit of 
Defendant’s police interview. Id.  
-10- 
 Defendant did not testify at trial, but he called two witnesses: an 
eyewitness that saw Victim shoot Rakes and Defendant running away, R801-
09; and the officer who initially interviewed Victim, R809-20. Defendant also 
based his defense on cross-examination of the State’s witnesses and his 
videotaped police interview. R579-621, 649-63, 778-94. Defendant argued that 
he did not participate in the crime, that he actively tried to dissuade Rakes 
from committing the crime, and he challenged Victim and Girlfriend’s 
credibility. R853-61.  
 At some point during its deliberations, the jury asked for the video 
evidence and it was provided—including the video of Defendant’s police 
interview. R872-73. The jury watched the interview video, but it is unknown 
how much of it the jury watched. R874. About twenty minutes after the jury 
requested the video evidence, defense counsel alerted the trial court that he 
had not intended for the video of Defendant’s police interview to go back to 
the jury room. R782-73. The bailiff removed the laptop from the jury room, 
but the jury had already watched at least some of the video. R874.  
 Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. R873-78. The court took the 
motion under advisement pending the jury verdict. R878. After the jury 
found Defendant guilty as charged, the trial court ordered briefing. R883-84, 
878-79. 
-11- 
 After oral argument and briefing, the trial court denied Defendant’s 
mistrial motion. R240-42, 248-53, 257-60, 913-15. The court found that the jury 
should not have viewed the interview during deliberations, but any error was 
harmless. R259. The court explained that Defendant had not shown 
harmlessness because the State presented sufficient evidence to support the 
jury’s guilty verdict even without the video. Id. The court also explained that 
Defendant would have benefitted from any undue weight the jury may have 
given the video, the jury only had access to the video for twenty minutes, and 
the jury did not have the ability to repeatedly view the testimony during 
deliberations. R259-60. 
 The trial court sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate prison term of 
ten years to life. R926. Defendant timely appealed. R269.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Point I. Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for not 
objecting to the inclusion of the accomplice liability elements instruction, 
Instruction 40. In support, Defendant argues that the instruction was 
incorrect because it did not specifically require the jury to find that Defendant 
had the intent to facilitate the commission of an aggravated robbery.   
 Defendant’s claim fails because he cannot show either deficient 
performance or prejudice. Defendant cannot show that his counsel’s 
-12- 
performance was constitutionally deficient where the instruction, whether 
read alone or with the other two accomplice liability instructions, properly 
instructed the jury that Defendant must possess the culpable mental state of 
the principal crime. For this same reason, Defendant cannot show prejudice. 
He also cannot show prejudice because ample evidence supported the 
verdict.  
 Point II. Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed 
the jury to view his videotaped police interview during deliberations. At trial, 
Defendant did not object to the jury taking the video during deliberations. 
However, after the jury watched at least some of the video during its 
deliberations, Defendant moved for a mistrial on this ground. Defendant 
argues his mistrial motion preserved his claim. Alternatively, Defendant 
argues that his counsel was ineffective.  
 To preserve a claim of error, a defendant must make a timely objection. 
Defendant’s objection was not timely. Defendant’s mistrial motion was made 
after the alleged error occurred, depriving the trial court of the opportunity 
to timely address the issue at trial, before jury deliberations, or before the 
video was sent back to the jury room. His mistrial motion, therefore, did not 
preserve his claim. 
-13- 
 Thus, to prevail, Defendant must show that his counsel was ineffective. 
On this record, Defendant cannot prove either deficient performance or 
prejudice. Defendant cannot prove that all competent counsel would have 
objected to the jury re-watching the video of his police interview during 
deliberations because the interview is the only evidence supporting that 
Defendant attempted to stop the carjacking, that Rakes’s plan to steal Victim’s 
car was not mutual, and that Defendant did not have a gun. Nor can 
Defendant show prejudice where ample evidence supported his conviction 
and his argument was speculative.  
 Point III. Defendant argues that this Court should reverse on 
cumulative error. His claim fails because there was no error, let alone 
cumulative error.  
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVEN THAT HIS COUNSEL 
PERFORMED INEFFECTIVELY BY APPROVING THE 
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION 
 Defendant argues that his trial counsel performed deficiently for not 
objecting to the accomplice liability elements instruction, Instruction 40. 
Br.Aplt.15-29. Defendant argues that his counsel should have objected to 
Instruction 40 because, he says, it omitted the required mental state that he 
-14- 
intended to aid the commission of an aggravated robbery. Br.Aplt.15-23. This, 
Defendant argues, means the jury could have convicted him of being an 
accomplice to the aggravated robbery even though he only intended to aid 
the commission of a lesser crime. Br.Aplt.15-23. But a competent attorney 
could have concluded that Instruction 40 alone or the instructions as a whole, 
especially read in light of the evidence, adequately conveyed the correct 
mental state requirement. And read in light of the evidence, there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted without finding that Defendant 
intended to aid the commission of an aggravated robbery.  
 To show that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant must prove that 
his counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced as a result. See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89, 694 (1984); State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, ¶19, 12 P.3d 92. Defendant must prove both elements. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Under Strickland, it is never enough to “show that 
counsels’ performance could have been better” or that it “might have 
contributed to [a] conviction.” State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1258–59 (Utah 
1993). Instead, Defendant must show “actual unreasonable representation and 
actual prejudice.” Id. 1259 (emphasis in original). This standard is “highly 
demanding.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986). And 
-15- 
“[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).  
A. Defendant has not proven deficient performance.  
 To show deficient performance under Strickland, Defendant must show 
that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688. “[T]rial counsel’s error must be so egregious 
that no reasonably competent attorney would have acted similarly.” Harvey 
v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011). This Court’s 
review of counsel’s performance thus begins with a “strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.” State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted).  
 The Strickland standard of objective reasonableness demands that 
“judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance” be “highly deferential.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Because there are a “variety of circumstances faced 
by defense counsel” in any given case counsel must be given “wide latitude” 
to choose between a “range of legitimate decisions,” frequently in the heat of 
trial. Id.; see State v. J.A.L., 2011 UT 27, ¶25, 262 P.3d 1 (“[A]n attorney’s job is 
to act quickly, under pressure, with the best information available.”). After 
all, there is rarely “one [right] technique or approach” in a given situation. 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106 (2011). “Even the best criminal defense 
-16- 
attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.” Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689.  
 Accordingly, the purpose of the deficiency inquiry “is not to grade 
counsel’s performance” or determine whether counsel made the best or most 
reasonable choice. Id. 697. Rather, it is to determine whether counsel’s “acts 
or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance” given “the facts of the particular case.” Id. 690.  
 A defendant bears the heavy burden of overcoming the “strong 
presumption” of reasonableness by “identify[ing] the acts or omissions of 
counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional 
judgment.” Id. He then must show that counsel’s actions “amounted to 
incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms.’” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
At bottom, a defendant must prove that “no competent attorney” 
would have done what his attorney did. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 
(2011). Consequently, a defendant cannot prevail merely by showing that a 
reasonable alternative choice, even a “more reasonable or effective” one, 
could have been implemented, so long as the choice actually made was 
reasonable. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶¶41, 43, 328 P.3d 841, abrogated on 
other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016; see also Roe v. 
-17- 
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000) (the Sixth Amendment “imposes one 
general requirement: that counsel make objectively reasonable choices”). 
An appellate court’s “highly deferential” review, therefore, “must 
judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the 
particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct” and “from 
counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90. It must not 
“second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence,” but 
must make “every effort…to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Id. 
689. Indeed, the “Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not 
perfect advocacy judge with the benefit of hindsight.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 
540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (per curiam). And again, “counsel is strongly presumed 
to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in 
the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
 Defendant has failed to overcome this presumption and show deficient 
performance. Defendant argues that his counsel performed deficiently by 
approving Instruction 40 because it did not explain that he needed to possess 
the culpable mental state of aggravated robbery. Br.Aplt.15-23. But a 
competent attorney could have concluded that Instruction 40 alone or the 
instructions as a whole, especially read in light of the evidence, adequately 
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conveyed the correct mental state requirement. Thus, Defendant has not 
shown that no competent attorney would have approved the instruction.  
 Jury instructions “must accurately and adequately inform a criminal 
jury as to the basic elements of the crime charged.” State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 
3 (Utah App. 1993). Even when jury instructions are assessed for technical 
correctness, they “cannot be viewed in isolation.” State v. Lambdin, 2017 UT 
46, ¶50, 424 P.3d. 117. Instructions “must be evaluated as a whole to 
determine their adequacy.” State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ¶13, 18 P.3d 1123.  
Thus, this Court “‘will affirm when the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly 
tender the case to the jury [even where] one or more of the instructions, 
standing alone, are not as full or accurate as they might have been.’” Id. 
(citations omitted); accord State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ¶18, 132 P.3d 703.  
 When reviewing jury instructions within the context of an 
ineffectiveness claim, however, Defendant also carries his burden of proving 
deficient performance. See State v. Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ¶¶22–25, 318 P.3d 1164. 
And that requires more than merely showing that his attorney could have 
secured “better” instructions. See Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶¶41, 43 (defendant 
cannot show deficient performance by pointing to an alternative, possibly 
more reasonable choice, so long as choice actually employed was reasonable); 
Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1258 (“it is not enough [to] show that counsels’ performance 
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could have been better”). Indeed, there has likely never been a case where an 
attorney could not have done something better. For that reason, the Sixth 
Amendment does not guarantee perfect counsel, only a reasonably 
competent one.  Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 24 (2013); Richter, 562 U.S. at 110. 
 Here, Defendant has not shown his counsel performed deficiently by 
approving Instruction 40. A competent attorney could have concluded that 
Instruction 40 adequately conveyed the correct mental state requirement.  
Instruction 40 provided:  
A person can commit a crime as a “party.” In other words, a 
person can commit a criminal offense even though that person 
did not personally do all of the acts that make up the offense. If 
you find beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
 (1) the defendant intentionally,  
(2) solicited, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided 
another to commit the offense, AND  
(3) the offense was committed,  
then you can find the defendant guilty of that offense. 
R227 (emphasis in original). 
          Although aggravated robbery was not expressly identified in the 
instruction, on this record, there could be no confusion that “the offense” 
referred to aggravated robbery. Indeed, Defendant was only charged with 
one crime—aggravated robbery. R222. And the jury was instructed that to 
find Defendant guilty of aggravated robbery, it had to find that  beyond a 
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reasonable doubt, that Defendant “as a party to the offense unlawfully and 
intentionally took or attempted to take personal property in the possession of 
another, from his person or immediate presence against his will by means of 
force or fear, with the purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently 
or temporarily of the personal property; and [] that in the course of 
committing these acts as a party: used or threatened to use a dangerous 
weapon; or took or attempted to take an operable motor vehicle.” R222 
(instruction 35). In short, the instructions informed the jury that it had to find 
that Defendant “intentionally” committed aggravated robbery to find him 
guilty as an accomplice. Id; R227. Given these instructions, competent counsel 
could have reasonably concluded that Instruction 40 adequately conveyed 
the required mental state.  
 Additionally, competent counsel would not object to Instruction 40 
because the other instructions clarify any possible confusion. The jury was 
given two other accomplice liability instructions in addition to Instruction 40.  
 Instruction 39 (statutory instruction) provided: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of the offense who directly commits the offense, 
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct 
which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct. 
R226. 
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Instruction 41 (definition instruction) provided:  
 Prior knowledge that a crime is about to be committed or is 
being committed does not make a person an accomplice, and 
thereby does not subject them to criminal prosecution unless the 
person has the mental state required to commit the crime and he 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids in 
the perpetration of the crime.  
 Further, his mere presence at the crime scene does not in 
itself subject him to criminal prosecution for any crime, unless 
you find beyond a reasonable doubt he possessed the mental 
state required to commit the crime and he acted in such a manner 
that he solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
intentionally aided in the perpetration of the crime.  
 If, on the other hand, you have a reasonable doubt as to 
whether the defendant possessed the mental state required to 
commit the crime or whether he solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided in the 
perpetration of the crime(s), you must find him not guilty of the 
charge.   
R228. 
 In State v. Augustine, Augustine was charged as an accomplice to 
attempted murder. 2013 UT App 61, ¶10, 298 P.3d 693. The accomplice 
liability instruction at his trial quoted the accomplice liability statute, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 “word-for-word.” Id. ¶10. A separate instruction 
informed the jury that to convict Augustine of attempted murder, it had to 
find that he “intentionally attempted to cause the death of another person.”  
Id. This Court held that an instruction that quoted the accomplice liability 
statute, together with a correct instruction on the mental state element of the 
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charged crime, correctly instructed the jury on accomplice liability.  See 2013 
UT App 61, ¶¶8-10. This Court explained that the statutory language “clearly 
indicate[d] that a requirement of accomplice liability is that the accomplice 
“‘act[ ] with the mental state required for the … offense.’” Id. ¶10 (quoting 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-202) (alteration in original). This Court, therefore, 
held that the language of the accomplice liability statute, coupled with the 
element instruction on attempted murder, “adequately explained” the “mens 
rea required for accomplice liability.”  Id. 
 And in State v. Clark, this Court reiterated its holding in Augustine. 2014 
UT App 56, ¶55, 322 P.3d 761. In Clark, Clark was charged with, among other 
things, as an accomplice to aggravated robbery. Id. ¶¶7, 52, 56. The 
accomplice liability instruction at his trial quoted section 76-2-202 and a 
separate instruction detailed the aggravated robbery elements, including the 
required mental state. Id. ¶55. This Court held that the instructions 
“accurately and adequately informed the jury as to accomplice liability when 
read and evaluated as a whole.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).  
 Like Augustine and Clark, the jury instructions, in this case, were 
equally clear. Instruction 39 quoted the accomplice liability statute verbatim, 
thus, it likewise “clearly indicate[d]” that the jury could not convict 
Defendant without first finding that he “act[ed] with the mental state 
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required for the” offenses with which he was charged. See Augustine, 2013 UT 
App 61, ¶10 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202). Instructions 40 and 41 
then explained accomplice liability further. Instruction 40 explained that 
Defendant could only be found guilty if the jury believed that he intentionally 
acted as an accomplice when committing “the offense”—referring the jury 
back to the aggravated robbery instruction. See R227. Instruction 41 
repeatedly instructed the jury that Defendant could only be found guilty if 
he had “the mental state required” to commit aggravated robbery and he 
acted as an accomplice. See R228. And because the aggravated robbery 
elements instruction explained the requisite mental state, the instructions as 
a whole adequately explained the mental state required for accomplice 
liability. See R222 (instruction 35); Augustine, 2013 UT App 61, ¶10. Thus, 
Defendant cannot show his counsel was deficient for not objecting to the 
instruction because when the three accomplice liability instructions are read 
together, they indicated that accomplice liability requires that the accomplice 
“‘act[ ] with the mental state required for the … offense.’” Augustine, 2013 UT 
App 61, ¶10 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202) (alteration in original).  
 But even if Instruction 40 could have been more “full or accurate,” that 
is not sufficient to show error, let alone deficient performance. See Lee, 2014 
UT App 4, ¶23. Again, the question here is not whether the instructions were 
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erroneous, but whether no competent counsel would have approved them. 
Because the instructions when read together correctly stated the law, it was 
objectively reasonable for counsel to not object to the instructions as given. 
 In arguing the contrary, Defendant argues that because Instruction 40 
is identical to the erroneous accomplice liability instruction in State v. Jeffs, 
2010 UT 49, 243 P.3d 1250 and State v. Grunwald, 2018 UT App 46, 424 P.3d 
990, his counsel performed deficiently by not objecting to its inclusion. 
Br.Aplt.16-23,24. Defendant’s reliance on Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, and Grunwald, 
2018 UT App 46, is misplaced.  
 In Jeffs, Jeffs was convicted of two counts of rape as an accomplice. Jeffs, 
2010 UT 49, ¶1. On appeal, Jeffs claimed that the accomplice liability 
instruction at his trial was erroneous. The supreme court agreed, holding that 
the instruction was inadequate because it “only indicated” that the “mental 
state attached to the actions of ‘solicited, requested, commanded, or 
encouraged,’ not to the underlying criminal conduct of rape.”  Id. ¶42. 
 In Grunwald, Grunwald was convicted of eleven counts as an 
accomplice, including aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder, 
and aggravated robbery. 2018 UT App 46, ¶¶1, 19. On appeal, Grunwald 
argued that her counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the accomplice 
liability jury instructions because the instructions allowed her to be convicted 
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as an accomplice even if she did not possess the mental state of the principal 
offense. Id. ¶¶33-36. This Court agreed with Grunwald that her counsel 
performed deficiently by not objecting, but held that she had not proven her 
counsel was ineffective because she did not prove prejudice. Id. ¶¶42, 50-58. 
 In Jeffs and Grunwald, the accomplice liability instructions only 
included the erroneous accomplice liability elements instruction. Neither 
case included the additional accomplice liability statute or definition 
instructions, as is the case here. Jeffs and Grunwald are therefore inapplicable. 
See 2010 UT 49, ¶41; 2018 UT App 46, ¶31.  
 Thus, Defendant has not overcome the strong presumption of 
reasonableness. Nor has he established “actual unreasonable representation.” 
See Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1259 (emphasis in original); accord Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687–89. This Court should deny Defendant’s ineffectiveness claim for this 
reason alone.  
 B. Defendant has not proven prejudice. 
 Defendant argues that there is a reasonable probability that the jury 
would have acquitted him but for the omitted mental state language in 
Instruction 40. Br.Aplt.26-30.  
 To prove prejudice, Defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable 
probability” that but for counsel’s performance, “the result of the proceeding 
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would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.” Id. Proof of prejudice “must be a demonstrable reality,” not mere 
speculation. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). Errors that have 
an “isolated” or “trivial effect” on the verdict are not prejudicial. Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 695-96. Thus, even where a jury instruction is erroneous, the error 
may nevertheless be harmless in light of the evidence. See State v. Hutchings, 
2012 UT 50, ¶¶24-28, 285 P.3d 1183. 
 For essentially the same reasons Defendant fails to show all competent 
counsel would have objected to Instruction 40, he fails to show prejudice. 
Instruction 40, whether read alone or with the other instructions, adequately 
conveyed the correct mental state to the jury.  
 Additionally, on this record, there is no reasonable likelihood that 
Defendant would have been acquitted but for counsel’s alleged error of 
including Instruction 40. To prevail, Defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result if the jury had been correctly 
instructed. See, e.g., State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, ¶¶21-23, 154 P.3d 788. When 
assessing whether this is so, this Court must “‘consider the totality of the 
evidence’” that was before the jury. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ¶28 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). This Court must also “‘review the record facts in 
-27- 
a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.’”  Id. ¶26 (quoting State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, ¶2, 10 P.3d 346). When assessing those facts, this Court “can rely 
on the presumption that the jury disbelieved the evidence in conflict with the 
jury verdict . . . .” State v. Gardner, 2007 UT 70, ¶25, 167 P.3d 1074; see also 
Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, ¶26. 
 In Grunwald, the erroneous jury instruction was not prejudicial because 
the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that Grunwald acted with the 
required mental state. 2018 UT App 46, ¶¶49-54. Thus, Grunwald had not 
proven ineffective assistance of counsel because her counsel’s deficient 
performance did not prejudice her. Id. ¶75. 
 State v. Apodaca provides another example of a harmless jury 
instruction error. See 2018 UT App 131, 428 P.3d 99. The jury instructions 
erroneously allowed the jury to convict Apodaca of aggravated robbery as an 
accomplice if he acted knowingly instead of intentionally. Id.¶76. On appeal, 
Apodaca argued that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 
aggravated robbery instruction. Id. ¶68. This Court held that the inclusion of 
the erroneous jury instruction was not prejudicial because the evidence 
overwhelmingly demonstrated that Apodaca acted with the required 
intentional mental state. Id. ¶¶79-83. Thus, Apodaca’s counsel was not 
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ineffective because he had not proven the prejudice element of Strickland v. 
Washington. Id. ¶84. 
 So too here. The objective evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that 
Defendant acted with the require intentional mental state.  
 At trial, the State presented Victim, Girlfriend, and police testimony, 
video surveillance of the PT Cruiser flipping over, photos of Defendant 
leaving the scene, and Defendant’s videotaped police interview. R558-60, 
637-38; SE 8-11. Both Victim and Girlfriend testified that Defendant looked 
for jumper cables—perpetuating Rakes’s ruse. R559, 637-38. And Victim 
testified that Defendant also threatened him with a gun. R558, 560. Victim 
and Girlfriend’s accounts never changed. See R863.  
 The jury saw Defendant’s police interview where Defendant gave 
multiple stories—at first denying any knowledge and finally admitting to the 
plan and his participation. R716-19, 752, 756, 763-775; SE11 (00:34-16:04). 
Defendant’s videotaped police interview corroborated much of Victim and 
Girlfriend’s testimony. During the interview, Defendant admitted that the 
Victim moved his car nose-to-nose with the PT Cruiser, Victim stood on the 
passenger side in between the cars, and Rakes chased Victim. SE 11 (8:55-
16:04). Defendant admitted that he knew that Rakes wanted Victim’s car and 
planned to isolate Victim by asking him for a jump-start. Id. Defendant 
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admitted that he went along with Rakes’s ruse by pretending to look for 
jumper cables. Id. And Defendant admitted that he did not walk away from 
the robbery. Id. Thus, objective evidence showed that Defendant intentionally 
participated in Rakes’s plan. 
 Despite this, Defendant argues that the jury heard “compelling 
evidence upon which they could have doubted” Defendant’s guilt. 
Br.Aplt.26. Defendant argues that the evidence did not support that there was 
a mutual plan to rob Defendant, Defendant wanted to take part in the crime, 
or Victim was credible. Br.Aplt. 26-28. But the jury heard all of the evidence—
including the evidence Defendant points to—and convicted anyway.  
 Defendant also argues that the jury “could perhaps conclude” that 
Defendant acted “recklessly.” Br.Aplt.28. But the jury was never instructed 
on the reckless mental state. R205-29. Indeed, the only mental state the jury 
was instructed on was intentionally. R215. Without an instruction, Defendant 
cannot show that the jury would have relied on the wrong mental state to 
convict. 
  Thus, Defendant has not—and cannot—show but for counsel’s alleged 




DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVEN THAT HIS COUNSEL 
PERFORMED INEFFECTIVELY BY NOT OBJECTING TO THE 
JURY RE-WATCHING THE VIDEO OF HIS POLICE INTERVIEW 
DURING DELIBERATIONS   
 Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his mistrial 
motion because he was prejudiced by the jury re-watching the video of his 
police interview during its deliberations. Br.Aplt.32-39.  
 The trial court agreed with Defendant that the jury should not have 
viewed the interview during deliberations, but denied his motion because 
any error was harmless. R259. The court explained that any error was 
harmless because the State presented ample evidence to support the jury’s 
guilty verdict. Id. The court also explained that Defendant would have 
benefitted from any undue weight the jury may have given the video, the jury 
only had access to the video for twenty minutes, and the jury did not have 
the ability to repeatedly view the testimony during deliberations. R259-60. 
  Although Defendant did not object before the jury requested the video 
evidence—and re-watched at least a portion of the interview video, he argues 
that his mistrial motion sufficed to preserve an objection; alternatively, 
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for not preventing the 
videotaped interview from “stay[ing] out of the jury room,” in the first 
instance. Br.Aplt.32-39.  
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 But Defendant’s after-the-fact mistrial motion was too late to preserve 
his claim of error. He can therefore prevail only if he proves both Strickland 
elements: deficient performance and prejudice. 466 U.S. at 697. On this 
record, Defendant cannot prove either element.  
 A. Defendant’s claim is unpreserved. 
 Defendant argues that his claim is preserved because the trial court 
ruled on his mistrial motion. Br.Aplt.37. Defendant is incorrect.  
 The purpose of the preservation rule is “two-fold.” State v. Larrabee, 
2013 UT 70, ¶15, 321 P.3d 1136. First, preservation affords the trial court “’an 
opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it,’” 
”thereby promoting judicial economy.” Id. And second, it prevents 
“defendants from foregoing an objection ‘with the strategy of enhancing the 
defendant’s chances of acquittal and then if that strategy fails … claiming on 
appeal that the court should reverse,’ thereby encouraging fairness.” Id. 
(alteration in original). 
 To preserve a claim, a defendant must make a timely objection. Id. ¶16. 
An objection is not timely if it is made after the alleged error has occurred. Id. 
In Larrabee, Larrabee’s motion to arrest judgment made two months after the 
trial concluded was not timely. Id. Larrabee’s after-the-fact motion did not 
preserve his claims. Id. The supreme court explained that allowing 
-32- 
defendants to preserve a claim in an after-the-fact motion like a motion to 
arrest judgment “directly contradict[s] the purposes of the preservation rule.” 
Id. The court explained that an after-the-fact motion is insufficient to preserve 
an issue because it deprives the trial court of any opportunity to timely 
address the issue at trial, allowing defendants to strategically forgo objecting 
without the risk of losing their ability to appeal that issue. Id.   
 In State v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 49, ¶50, 428 P.3d 1052, Fullerton’s objection 
was not preserved because he raised it for the first time in a motion to arrest 
judgment. The supreme court explained that an objection not made during 
trial is “not timely if it is filed in a post-trial motion.” Id. ¶49. 
 Like in Larrabee and Fullerton, Defendant’s objection was untimely. 
Although Defendant had many opportunities to object to the jury re-
watching the video of his police interview during its deliberations, he did not 
do so.  
 For example, Defendant did not object to the video being admitted as 
an exhibit—he instead stipulated to its admission. R735. Nor did Defendant 
object or bring the video to the court’s attention at the close of the State’s case 
when the State informed the court that it had all the evidence. R799.  
Defendant did not object when the trial court asked both parties to ensure 
that all the exhibits the jury should have access to during its deliberations 
-33- 
were compiled. R870-71. He did not object when the trial court asked the 
parties to examine the laptop the jury would presumably use to watch the 
video evidence, including the video of Defendant’s police interview. Id. And 
he did not object when the jury requested the video evidence and the video 
of his interview was sent back to the jury room. R873.  
 To preserve his claim, Defendant should have either (1) at the time the 
State moved to admit the video into evidence, objected; (2) at the time the trial 
court asked the parties to make sure it had all of the exhibits for the jury to 
access during its deliberations, moved to exclude the video under Rule 17 (k), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; or (3) before the jury was excused to 
deliberate, moved to exclude the video under Rule 17 (k). Rule 17 (k)  allows 
the jury to “take with them …all exhibits which have been received as 
evidence except exhibits that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in 
possession of the jury.” But Defendant did none of this. 
 Defendant’s after-the-fact mistrial motion deprived the trial court of 
the opportunity to address the issue during trial, before the video was given 
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to the jury during their deliberations. Thus, his objection was untimely. See 
Larrabee, 2018 UT 70, ¶¶15-16. Defendant’s claim is therefore not preserved.2 
 B. Defendant has not proven prejudice.  
 Because Defendant’s claim is not preserved, he must prove that his 
counsel was ineffective for not preventing the jury from re-watching the 
video of his police interview during their deliberations. Br.Aplt.37-38.  
 As explained, to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant 
carries the heavy burden of proving that counsel performed deficiently. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. He must also affirmatively prove “actual 
prejudice” resulting from counsel’s deficient performance. Tyler, 850 P.2d at 
1259.And where, as here, “it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on 
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed.” 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 670.  
 Defendant cannot prove that he was prejudiced by the jury re-watching 
the video of his police interview because there was no reasonable likelihood 
                                              
2 Even if preserved, however, Defendant’s claim still fails. First, 
Defendant affirmatively waived any objection, thus he is foreclosed from 
“taking advantage of an error committed at trial” because he “led the trial 
court into committing the error.” State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ¶54, 70 P.3d 
111 (defendant cannot take advantage of an error when he led the trial court 
into committing the error). In any event, as explained below, Defendant’s 
claim fails because he cannot show harm. See State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 
¶¶46-47, 27 P.3d 1133 (defendant must show “that there is a substantial 
likelihood that the jury would have found him not guilty”). 
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that the jury would have acquitted him if it had not re-watched the video. See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96. As shown in Point I, ample evidence supported 
Defendant’s intention to aid Rakes in the commission of an aggravated 
robbery. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (in assessing whether a defendant has 
carried his burden, a reviewing court “must consider the totality of the 
evidence before the judge or jury.”).   
 At trial, the State presented Victim’s and Girlfriend’s testimony, photos 
of Defendant leaving the scene, and Defendant’s videotaped police interview. 
R558-560, 637-38; SE 8-11. Both Victim and Girlfriend testified that 
Defendant’s role in the robbery was to perpetuate the ruse by searching for 
jumper cables. R558, 637-38. Victim testified that Defendant threatened him 
with his gun. R558-59. Victim and Girlfriend’s accounts never changed. R863. 
The jury watched Defendant’s police interview during trial, including his 
multiple versions of events and his last story where he admitted looking for 
jumper cables fully knowing that he was aiding Rakes in the carjacking. SE 
11 (2:31-16:04).  
 Despite this evidence, Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the 
jury re-watching the video of his police interivew because (1) the multiple 
versions of events he gave during the interview “could” have caused the jury 
to question his credibility; (2) the jury was “likely” exposed to video content 
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it had not seen at trial including Defendant in handcuffs; (3) the jury “likely” 
gave undue weight to the video; and (4) the fact the jury returned a verdict 
soon after requesting the video “suggests” that re-watching it influenced the 
jury verdict. Br.Aplt.35-36. 
 Defendant’s claim fails because it is speculative. “[P]roof of ineffective 
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a 
demonstrable reality.” Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 877. Speculation “cannot 
substitute for proof of prejudice.” State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 
1996). Defendant’s argument rests entirely on conjecture. He provides no 
evidence that re-watching the videotape influenced the jury at all. Without 
such supporting evidence and analysis, Defendant has not—and cannot— 
prove prejudice. See Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1259 (Defendant “has the difficult 
burden of showing…actual prejudice”) (emphasis in original).   
 Regardless, Defendant argues that re-watching the video may have 
caused the jury to question his credibility because the video showed him 
telling multiple stories. Br.Aplt.33. But the jury already saw this evidence 
during trial. Thus, re-watching it was cumulative and unlikely to sway the 
jury. See State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 1989) (in hearsay context, 
cumulative statements are harmless); State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234, ¶49, 387 
P.3d 618 (no prejudice where jury watched CJC video during deliberations).  
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 Defendant also argues that he was prejudiced because the jury may 
have watched footage not presented during trial of the detective handcuffing 
him and telling him  he would “probably go to jail for robbery.” Br.Aplt.34. 
As a threshold matter, there is no record evidence that the jury saw this part 
of the video. See Arguelles, 921 P.2d at, 441 (speculation is not proof of 
prejudice).  
 Relying on Lucas v. State, 791 S.W. 2d 35, 55-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), 
Defendant argues that the jury seeing him on video in handcuffs prejudiced 
him. But Defendant’s reliance is misplaced. In Lucas, the court held that no 
prejudice resulted when the jury watched a video of Lucas handcuffed at the 
crime scene. 791 S.W. 2d at 55-56. The court explained that the jury viewing 
Lucas handcuffed on video did not contribute to Lucas’s conviction because 
Lucas was not handcuffed at trial, and the jury was instructed on the 
presumption of innocence. Id.  
 Like Lucas, if the jury saw Defendant on video handcuffed inside a 
police station, Defendant was not prejudiced. Defendant was not in restraints 
during trial, and the jury was instructed on the presumption of innocence. 
R205. Moreover, it is common knowledge that individuals who are under 
arrest are typically handcuffed. See, e.g., Arrest, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrest last visited October 29, 2018 (photos 
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of individuals under arrest in handcuffs). Thus, Defendant cannot show 
prejudice.  
 The detective’s statement to Defendant that he “would probably go to 
jail for robbery” does not change this calculus. Br.Aplt.34. If the jury saw this 
part of the video, there is not a reasonable likelihood that Defendant would 
have been acquitted because Defendant was charged with and on trial for 
aggravated robbery. The statement did not provide the jury with any 
information that they did not already know.  
 Defendant argues that it is “likely” that the jury gave undue weight to 
the video and the record “suggests” that re-watching it influenced the verdict 
because the jury returned a verdict soon after requesting the video. 
Br.Aplt.35-36. At bottom, Defendant asks this Court to intrude into the jury’s 
deliberative process by speculating on how the jury perceived and weighed 
the evidence. Such intrusion is prohibited. Jessop v. Hardman, 2014 UT App 
28, ¶26, 319 P.3d 790 (citation omitted); see Utah R. Evid. 606(b) (prohibiting 
jurors from testifying or giving statement “about any statement made or 
incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations.”). 
 Jury “decision-making is designed to be a black box: the inputs 
(evidence and argument) are carefully regulated by law, and the output (the 
verdict) is publicly announced, but the inner workings and deliberation of 
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the jury are deliberately insulated from subsequent review.” Jessop, 2014 UT 
App 28, ¶26 (citation omitted). As this Court explained, the rule protecting 
jury deliberations “insulates …the jury from subsequent second-guessing by 
the judiciary.” Jessop, 2014 UT App 28, ¶26. This Court recognized that this 
“approach may seem to offend the search for perfect justice,” but explained 
that if “what went on in the jury room were judicially reviewable for 
reasonableness or fairness, trials would no longer truly be by jury, as the 
Constitution commands,” because “[f]inal authority would be exercised by 
whomever is empowered to decide whether the jury's decision was 
reasonable enough, or based on proper considerations.” Id. ¶27 (quotation 
omitted).  
Because Defendant asks this Court to speculate on how the jury 
weighed the evidence, his claim fails.   
 On this record, Defendant has not proven prejudice. See Tyler, 850 P.2d 
at 1259 (defendant must show “actual prejudice” to prevail) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original). This, his ineffectiveness claim fails. 
C. Defendant has not proven deficient performance.  
 Defendant argues his counsel performed deficiently because he did not 
have a strategic reason for allowing the jury to re-watch his police interview 
during its deliberations. Br.Aplt.39. In support, Defendant argues that trial 
-40- 
counsel admitted that he did not have a strategic reason for the exhibit to go 
to the jury room. Id. But Defendant’s reliance on strategy alone is misplaced. 
 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that “the relevant 
question, in a deficient performance analysis “is not whether counsel’s 
choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.” Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. at 481. A defendant who “persuad[es] the court that there was no 
conceivable tactical basis for counsel’s actions” has merely rebutted the 
“strong presumption” that counsel rendered adequate assistance. State v. 
Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶6, 89 P.3d 162; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. But rebutting 
the presumption of reasonableness does not establish that counsel was in fact 
objectively unreasonable—the standard announced by the Supreme Court. 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–89 (“defendant must show that counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”) 
(emphasis added).  
 Thus, even if no definitive “strategy” can be identified, Defendant 
cannot prevail unless he shows that counsel’s performance was objectively 
unreasonable. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 479 (Sixth Amendment “imposes 
one general requirement: that counsel make objectively reasonable choices”).  
 Counsel may perform reasonably even when his decision or action 
proves to be erroneous. Strickland asks only “whether an attorney’s 
-41- 
representation amounted to incompetence under ‘prevailing professional 
norms,’ not whether it deviated from best practices or most common 
custom.” Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The 
Sixth Amendment requires that counsel’s representation “be only objectively 
reasonable, not flawless or to the highest degree of skill.” Dows v. Wood, 211 
F.3d 480,487 (9th Cir.2000). Thus, counsel does not necessarily perform 
deficiently even if he makes “minor mistakes” and appears “momentarily 
confused during trial. Id. 487. Counsel’s performance is deficient under 
Strickland, only when “no competent attorney” would have acted similarly. 
Premo, 562 U.S. at 124; Harvey, 629 F.3d at 1239 (counsel is deficient only when 
his “error is so egregious that no reasonably competent attorney would have 
acted similarly”).  
 Defendant has not shown that no competent attorney would have sent 
his police interview back to the jury room. There “are countless ways to 
provide effective assistance of counsel in any given case.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 689. Although trial counsel here determined that the jury should not watch 
the video during deliberations, another competent attorney may come to a 
different decision. See id. (“Even the best criminal defense attorneys would 
not defend a particular client in the same way.”). As the trial court explained, 
“it was Defendant who would have benefitted from any undue weight the 
-42- 
jury might have placed on [the video] based on repeated viewings.” R259. 
Indeed, the video was the only evidence of Defendant’s story that he tried to 
dissuade Rakes from committing the carjacking, that the carjacking had not 
been the result of mutual plan, and that Defendant did not have a gun. SE 11 
(9:10-16:04). Moreover, the video captured Defendant’s cooperation, remorse, 
sincerity, and body language. Id.  
 Given these circumstances, Defendant cannot show that “no 
competent attorney” would have acted similarly, or that no “competent 
attorney” would have allowed the jury to re-watch the video during its 
deliberations. See Premo, 562 U.S. at 124. Thus, Defendant cannot prove 
deficient performance.  
III. 
CUMULATIVE ERROR DOES NOT JUSTIFY OVERTURNING 
THE JURY VERDICT 
 Defendant finally claims that this Court should reverse on cumulative 
error, if nothing else. Br.Aplt.39-40. An appellate court reverses on 
cumulative error only if errors are so pervasive and prejudicial that they 
“undermine[] [this Court’s] confidence" in the essential fairness of the trial. 
State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶363, 299 P.3d 892. Because there was no error, 
there is no cumulative error. And even if there were any error, its impact was 
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